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EDITORIAL
ASSESSMENT OF CERTAIN CLASSES OF
REAL ESTATE UNDER DEPRESSION
CONDITIONS
THE depression has added greatly to the burden
of the courts in reviewing assessments for
taxation of real estate and other property. This
is not only because stringent financial conditions
tend to encourage and almost compel property
owners to resist assessments which they regard as
too high, but also because the very existence of
the depression has greatly affected valuations, and
has thereby made the problem of the proper distribution of the tax burden more difficult. It is
the purpose here to discuss a few recent court
decisions, where the property concerned was affected not only by depression conditions, but by
peculiar circumstances of its own which would
increase the difficulty of its proper valuation even
in periods of reasonable prosperity.
Of such property, that of railroads is a typical
example. To determine a reasonable market value
for railroad property is difficult if not impossible,
even in normal times. This difficulty is heightened
by the depression, as is shown in the recent, but
already famous, decision of the Circuit Court of.
Appeals for the Third Circuit in Lehigh Valley R.
Co. v. Martin, 100 Fed. (2d) 139 (1938), involving
New Jersey property taxes.
This case could actually have been decided as a
matter of procedure. The railroads, having originally sued in the state courts, were held precluded
from suing in the federal courts, under the doctrine
of res judicata. However, the court did consider
the merits of the case and indicated that relief
would be refused apart from the procedural bar.
The court did admit that the method of assessment
used by New Jersey was seriously defective and
should be revised by the legislature. But, of course,
it is clear that a merely clumsy method of assessment does not call for judicial correction. More
serious was the suspicion so strongly held that it
was referred to by the court, "that the State of
New Jersey seeks to maintain itself by taxing the
appellants more and its other inhabitants less."
Clearly if this was a fact the assessment was invalid. But the court, while apparently sharing to
some extent the suspicion, refused relief because it
was only a suspicion; such discrimination must be
proved. The court several times cited Great North-
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ern R. Co. v. Weeks, 297 U. S. 135, 56 Sup. Ct.
426 (1936), 1 LEGAL NOTES 32 (March, 1936),
but declined to follow the apparent doctrine of that
case that the court should give relief on a mere
showing of substantial overvaluation without a
showing of discrimination. Thus the court criticizes
the method of valuation, and admits some grounds
for suspicion of discrimination; but it refuses relief
because that discrimination is not proved.
Another interesting problem is presented by the
decision of the District Court of Minnesota in
Minnesota v. FederalReserve Bank of Minneapolis,
25 Fed. Supp. 14 (1938). Here the problem was as
to the proper valuation of the building of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. The building is concededly well located and well constructed;
but its valuation would be difficult even in normal
times, because of peculiar features of its construction. It is architecturally somewhat unusual, and
it is designed not so much for ordinary commercial
banking but primarily for the safeguarding of its
assets; in other words, it is to a large extent z
fortress rather than a commercial building.
To increase the difficulty, it appeared that for
the years in question and for several years before,
business property in Minneapolis, even of the most
usual sort, was practically unsalable because of
depressed business conditions. This obviously
greatly increased the difficulty of determining any
reasonable market value of the property.
The assessor worked out various scientific
schemes of valuation, such as cost less physical
depreciation with some further allowance for obsolescence, the results of which the court approved.
The bank insisted upon a valuation based upon a
calculation of purely theoretical income from the
property, based on supposed use for ordinary
commercial purposes. It is well settled that income
from commercial property is an important, and
sometimes the most important, factor in computing
its value. (Detroit v. Detroit and Canada Tunne"
Co., 92 Fed. (2d) 833 (1937) 3 LEGAL NOTES 329
(March, 1938).) But here the property was not
being used primarily for income producing purposes,
and furthermore the income relied on by the taxpayer was purely theoretical. The court therefore
seems right, especially as the taxpayer's calculations
reduced this comparatively new and well con-
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structed bank building to practically scrap value
for tax purposes.
The chief criticism which could possibly be made
is that the court may have sanctioned a valuation
on some theory other than market value. The
theory of assessment on any other basis than market value is generally and properly condemned.
Perhaps the leading case is State ex rel. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Weiker, 177 Wis. 445,
188 N. W. 598 (1922). On the other hand, the
mere fact that property cannot presently be sold
does not mean that it has no value for tax purposes; otherwise, all the business center of Minneapolis (and no doubt many other cities) would
have been non-taxable during the worst of the
depression. It seems that the assessor used the
best method possible for computing a fair value
for the building; in any case, it appears that he
endeavored to put upon the bank its fair share,
but only its fair share, of the property tax burden.
In other words, no discrimination was intended;
and none in substance resulted.
A third case on this general subject is the decision of the Court of Appeals of Ohio for Hamilton
County in Linch v. Heuck, 16 N. E. (2d) 613
(1938). Here, unlike the cases previously discussed,
ordinary residence property was involved; but the
case presented what the court called "a rather
unique situation." This was because the owner so
desired this particular piece of land that he paid
very much more than the normal price for it, and
then bought it under a condition that he should
erect an elaborate residence, much more costly than
would be ordinarily justified in that location. The
result was that he spent approximately $180,000 for
the land and building, whereas, as the court admits,
the selling price would probably not exceed $50,000.
While it is not unusual for a person to find that
he has spent more for his home than he can sell
it for, such an extreme variation is certainly extraordinary.
The original assessent made by the county auditor was on a cubic content basis ordinarily used
for residences, but with a reduction of 21 percent
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because of the extravagance in location and construction. This gave him a figure of $94,600, or
about half the actual cost. The house was new,
so there was no substantial physical depreciation.
The tax commission reduced the assessment to
$76,340, the basis of the reduction not appearing.
The owner appealed to the court, which made a
further reduction to $50,000.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court
and reinstated the $76,340 assessment of the tax
commission. The court reached this conclusion on
the simple ground that there was no showing that
the tax commission had reached a wrong figure,
holding that a court has no jurisdiction to reverse
the assessing authorities merely because it disagrees
with them.
These cases seem to indicate that the courts are
not going to unreasonably interfere with the efforts
of assessing officers to distribute the burden of
property taxation in these troublesome times, so
long as this effort is made with reasonable fairness
and intelligence. The property owner cannot upset
an assessment merely because it seems high even
to the court, or because the method of assessment
seems subject to some criticism. Nor can he upset
an assessment merely because the property is temporarily unsalable or that a definite market value
for his particular kind of property would perhaps
always be more or less a matter of speculation.
To obtain judicial relief he must show that there is
a definite and rather serious discrimination, so that
he is having imposed upon him an unfair share
of the property tax burden of the locality. This
is all as it should be, and it is to be hoped that
other courts will follow the same rules. So far as
Great Northern R. Co. v. Weeks, supra, seems to
sanction judicial interference without a showing of
discrimination, it should be overruled. But all this
does not remove-indeed it emphasizes-the desirability and necessity of every possible effort to
perfect the assessment process, so as to give the
best results possible.
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